Dialectics of mindfulness: implications for western medicine by Sauer, Sebastian et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Dialectics of mindfulness: implications
for western medicine
Sebastian Sauer
1,2*, Siobhan Lynch
3,4, Harald Walach
5,6 and Niko Kohls
1,2,6
Abstract
Mindfulness as a clinical and nonclinical intervention for a variety of symptoms has recently received a substantial
amount of interest. Although the application of mindfulness appears straightforward and its effectiveness is well
supported, the concept may easily be misunderstood. This misunderstanding may severely limit the benefit of
mindfulness-based interventions. It is therefore necessary to understand that the characteristics of mindfulness are
based on a set of seemingly paradoxical structures. This article discusses the underlying paradox by disentangling it
into five dialectical positions - activity vs. passivity, wanting vs. non-wanting, changing vs. non-changing, non-
judging vs. non-reacting, and active acceptance vs. passive acceptance, respectively. Finally, the practical
implications for the medical professional as well as potential caveats are discussed.
Background
In the last two to three decades, the concept of mindful-
ness has received increasing attention, particularly in the
health sciences. Mindfulness is about being aware of
actual experiences from one moment to the next with
gentle acceptance [1-3]. This concept has been proposed
to contribute to the coping and recovery process in
many health conditions.
Both clinical as well as basic science researchers have
devoted a significant amount of study to this topic [4].
Moreover, with rapidly mounting evidence regarding the
therapeutic capacities of mindfulness practice, medical
professionals are increasingly incorporating such techni-
ques into their clinical repertoire. Probably the best
known and evaluated mindfulness-based treatment is
the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) that is
used in many clinical settings in the US and Canada
and evermore, in Europe [4].
Yet, integrating mindfulness into existing therapeutic
concepts may challenge medical professionals’ usual
practices for number of reasons. First and foremost,
mindfulness approaches do not aim at symptom reduc-
tion. Fundamentally, mindfulness is not intended to
explicitly eradicate pain, distress, or unwanted emotions.
However, philosophically and practically, medical
professionals endeavor to reduce suffering. If mindfulness
does not aim at reducing symptoms, then how can it be
helpful? In this essay, we argue that while mindfulness is
not meant to actively reduce symptoms, it may passively
modify their impact by changing an individual’s percep-
tions and mindset. Mindfulness is a set of practices,
if not a “way of being” that may incur salutogenic
(i.e., health-promoting) effects. This may lead to a mis-
conception of what mindfulness is, and how it works. We
believe that some of the apparently contradictory aspects
of mindfulness can be best understood by taking a
dialectical approach. It is not a new idea to explain psy-
chological health-related processes through the use of
paradoxical or dialectical approaches [5]. Indeed, we pro-
pose that the dialectical structure of mindfulness hall-
marks its essence, which may easily be misunderstood in
clinical practice.
The dialectical approach is quite different from the
conventional approach of symptom evaluation. The con-
ventional approach uses the current logic: a symptom is
either good or bad; present or absent; relevant or not.
The dialectical approach stresses that each thesis also
has to be considered in the light of its opposite (the
antithesis), and only both facets together (the synthesis)
yield a full picture. In this light, depression might be a
sign of a disorder that should be mitigated. But at the
same time, it must be acknowledged that there are inner
experiences that cannot be controlled or altered “at
will”. Hence, although the phenomenal quality of going
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.through depression may not be altered, a patient’s rela-
tion towards relevant inner states relevant to depression
may be changed due to mindfulness or other forms of
spiritual exercise [6,7].
Herein, we first elaborate on the dialectical structure of
mindfulness by providing an overview of 1) the theoreti-
cal foundation of the construct, 2) evidence of the clinical
effectiveness, and 3) putative neurobiological correlates
of mindfulness. We then introduce five dialectical posi-
tions that we believe are useful for resolving the apparent
paradox associated with mindfulness and its relevant
mechanisms of action. Finally, on the basis of this discus-
sion, we derive the utility and implications of mindful-
ness for medicine, and address potential caveats.
Roots of the concept of mindfulness
M i n d f u l n e s si sa no l dc o n c e p t ;its theoretical roots were
formulated by the Buddha, who characterized himself as
a physician. He stated that his primary work was to iden-
tify the maladies afflicting humankind, and to establish a
way through which every individual could attain lasting
absence from suffering rather than complete well-being
[8]. He claimed that mere belief and rational reasoning
were not sufficient to mitiga t es u f f e r i n g .H ep r o p o s e d
m i n d f u l n e s sa sa“direct way” to confront suffering by
transcending it. Interestingly, the Buddha did not aim to
establish an institutionalized form for disseminating his
insights, such as a sect or a religion. His devotion to the
self-reliance and self-dependence of each individual also
demonstrates the very essence of mindfulness: “Do not
believe in anything because it is rumored and spoken by
many” [[9] p. 137]. He called for accepting only what one
has analyzed by direct and immediate experience. On
this basis, mindfulness can be described by its two
inter-related facets: (1) the capacity to dispassionately
observe the present moment, through (2) a stance of
non-judgmental and accepting openness [10,11].
Unlike the contemporary practice of medicine that can
be seen as “objective” and a mediated “third person per-
spective”, mindfulness is experienced in the subjective
and immediate “first person perspective”, or by means
of direct and unbiased introspection. Historically, this
epistemological approach has also been part of the work
of the psychologists Franz Brentano, William James,
(and to some extent) Wilhelm Wundt and his disciple
Edward Titchener, as well as by the phenomenologist
Edmund Husserl [6,12]. The dialogical I-Thou philoso-
phy of Martin Buber also evidences similarities to the
concept of mindfulness [13].
Some scholars claim that the methodology of the
science of inner experiences is not well developed
[14,15] and that the phenomenological properties of
inner experiences of consciousness cannot be shared. By
contrast, the epistemological grounding of mindfulness -
particularly to the Buddhist tradition - holds that great
insight can be derived from first person approaches that
are also valid from an intersubjective point of view [16].
For example, prolonged practice of mindfulness may
develop the ability to dissect experiences into more
subtle parts thereby revealing the transient nature of
perceptions [17].
Clinical effectiveness and neurobiological correlates of
mindfulness
A body of research suggests that the facilitation of
mindfulness has a positive impact on a variety of mental
health symptoms, such as stress, anxiety, some personal-
ity disorders, chronic pain, and substance abuse. To
date, several meta-analyses substantiate such clinical
effects [1,18,19]. Additionally, there is evidence that
mindfulness has an impact on endocrinological and neu-
rophysiological function. For example, Davidson and col-
leagues found a greater increase in antibody titers after
vaccination in individuals practicing mindfulness on a
regular basis as compared to non-practitioners [20].
More recently, in a randomized trial, Tang et al. [21]
found that mindfulness practitioners showed more regio-
nal cerebral blood flow in the right anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), including the subgenual ACC (Brodmann
area (BA) 25), and adjacent ventral ACC (BA 32), the left
insula, occipital lobule, right posterior cingulate cortex,
right precuneus, and subcortical structures of the puta-
men and caudate. These brain areas have been related to
emotional regulation [22]. Also, both Lazar et al. [23] and
Hölzel et al. [24] demonstrated that mindfulness may be
associated with an increase of gray matter which persists
longitudinally in certain brain areas. These researchers
found that gray matter concentration in the left inferior
temporal gyrus was correlated with meditative profi-
ciency, corroborating the assumption of a positive impact
of meditation training on gray matter concentration in
this region [25,26]. These results suggest that the ability
of mindfulness to influence emotional state has not only
a neurological base, but that mindfulness training -
according to neuroplasticity paradigm - may actually
influence the structural composition of the brain.
Resolving the Paradox: The Dialectics of Mindfulness
In the following sections we discuss five aspects of
mindfulness that are all related to the underlying dialec-
tical principle. In our view, these five dialectical aspects
are a valuable way to address the apparent paradoxical
structure of the construct.
Dialectics of Activity vs. Passivity
Mindfulness can be considered as a provokingly passive
method. Mindfulness teachers explain the practice of
mindfulness as “one simply examines every phenomenon”
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to learn how not to react” [[17] p. 97]. Mindfulness implies
calmly observing unwanted inner or outer experiences.
Psychologically, this means that the drives related to appe-
titive or aversive stimuli must be voluntarily suspended to
the most possible extent. The first drive has been termed
“approach motivation” and the latter “avoidance motiva-
tion” [27]. Probably the most obvious difference to other
treatments commonly employed, is that mindfulness advo-
cates suspending cognitive, emotional or behavioral
actions when facing negative experiences. In devising the
antithesis, mindfulness seeks to engage a mechanism
known as “apperception” a mental process that is respon-
sible for perceiving, gauging, adopting and transforming
an individual’s experiences in order to create a new con-
scious concept based upon former experiences as well as
inner states of the mind. Mindfulness involves meticulous
and continuous observation of the prevalent sensory and
mental processes by means of being fully present: Every
moment and detail of a given experience is to be observed
scrupulously, without cognitive and emotional evaluation
of the respective event. This process involves a high degree
of alertness and activity [28]. Hence, we claim that mind-
fulness is at the same time a way of being passive (with
regard to gauging and reacting towards external stimuli)
and of being active (with regard to observing the present
moment and the accompanying inner states of mind). By
means of reconfiguring the cognitively active and passive
components, the thesis and antithesis of seemingly contra-
dicting processes are resolved, and mindfulness can be
regarded as a synthesis.
Dialectics of Wanting vs. Non-wanting
Some authors argue that mindfulness is a “non-striving”
state of being, thereby precluding goal-oriented behavior
[29]. In other words, it is held that being mindful con-
tradicts wanting, aspiring, or desiring something. These
authors state that during a deep state of mindfulness, a
person has no goals and does not want for anything
during the time of practice. Although this concept may
be appealing, we doubt that an individual can be in a
state in which she does not want anything at all, at least
in situations that entail active behavior. How could a
person be motivated to begin and stay within a mindful
state? The fact that an individual starts or continues a
mindfulness exercise from one moment to the next
explicitly shows that she does aspire to be mindful.
Additionally, why should one engage mindfulness
meditation at all? Would she not aspire to achieve a cer-
tain goal implicitly or explicitly associated with this
technique? Hence, upholding mindfulness practice can-
not be simply equated with “non-wanting”,b u tr a t h e r
implies wanting to achieve something such as reducing
suffering and distress or gaining essential insights to
phenomenological experience. At the same time, we
a d m i tt h a tt h em i n d f u l n e s sa n t i t h e s i si sa to d d sw i t ha
certain understanding of what “wanting” comprises. To
be more precise, “unconditional wanting” is the opposite
of mindfulness as it refers to a mental state where
something is sought after to such a degree that not
achieving the desired state would lead to dissatisfaction.
It has been argued that unconditional wanting leads to
breakdown of inner balance if the desired state is not
achieved [17]. In fact, even if a person reaches the
intended goal, the mind cannot be balanced, according
to the theory of mindfulness, if the wanting is too
strong. Both unconditional wanting or craving ("I must
have this!”)a n da v e r s i o n( " T h i sm u s tg oa w a y ! ”)a r e
forms of non-mindful states. Hence, the synthesis of the
wanting-non-wanting dialectics reveals that a “gentle”
form of wanting reflects the volitional processes under-
lying mindfulness, whereas “unconditional” wanting
(both craving and aversion) cannot conform to the
philosophy of mindfulness.
Dialectics of Therapeutic Change vs. Non-Change
Medical professionals strive to alleviate suffering. Many
medical professionals have used mindfulness techniques
in order to lessen the suffering of the patients they treat
[30]. Yet, mindfulness theory claims that pain and
related symptoms must be accepted by embracing them
with an attitude of equanimit y .A c c o r d i n g l y ,i ft h i s
aspect of mindfulness is cultivated, there is no longer
any real argument for changing inferior and negative
sensations, emotions, or symptoms. This is a critical but
often misunderstood aspect of mindfulness that rests
upon the fact that changing one’s relation to the symp-
tom has been mistaken for changing the symptom.
Empirical research indicates that mindfulness training
leads to a reduction of pain and anxiety [31], not by
directly lessening symptoms, but by changing patients’
attitudes toward them. Hayes et al. [32] describe that
mindfulness aims at establishing a psychological stance
of preparedness in which formerly unwanted feelings
can be accepted. To give an example, anxiety is not
necessarily a problem, if anxiety is embraced with the
right state of mind. Simply, if one is able to accept anxi-
ety, anxiety gradually loses its effect, simply because it
can be contained; finally, the degree of fear will decrease
as a result of reduced emotional impact. Thus, mindful-
ness is about being aware of experience, and gently
accepting it. The finding that mindfulness reduces psy-
chosomatic symptoms may be explained by two
mechanisms. First, if a symptom of distress, such as
anxiety, is subjectively accepted and embraced rather
than resisted, it becomes less threatening. This is likely
the reason why decreased levels of distress, anxiety, and
depression are reported after mindfulness interventions.
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behavioral changes associated with decline of symptoms
become more probable [33].
Recent research has shed light upon the possible
mechanisms of mindfulness. Kohls, Sauer, and Walach
described two main aspects of mindfulness, i.e., “pre-
sence” (attending to the present moment) and “accep-
tance” (non-judgmental attitude) [10]. Their work
suggested that presence is a way to instill an attitude of
acceptance, which is in turn responsible for buffering
distress. It appears that presence itself does not buffer
distress but allows one to build the non-judgmental atti-
tude that seems to be responsible for health-relevant
effects.
Taken together, the synthesis of change and no-
change distinguishes between what is changed through
the practice of mindfulness - an emotional connection
with the symptom - and what is (primarily) unchanged -
the symptom itself. As changes in the symptom itself
are not intended, mindfulness may be understood as a
transformation of the relationship between self and
symptom.
Dialectics of Non-judging vs. Non-Reacting
A facet of the definition of mindfulness is “non-judging”,
which has been advocated by Kabat-Zinn [34,35] and
subsequently more widely accepted [29,36,37]. However,
we suggest a word of caution here. Let us start by
posing a question. Is it possible to cognitively perceive
something and concomitantly to abstain from all
judgments? To answer this question, it is necessary to
understand judging. Literature on perception and cogni-
tive psychology suggests that judging primarily entails
identifying a perception as representative of a certain
mental category (e.g., sparrow as a bird) [38]. The rele-
vant category has different attributes including a valence
continuum (from “Il i k ei t ” to “Id o n ’tl i k ei t ”)w i t h
various degrees of intensity. It is unlikely that a well-
learned category attribute ("weapons - not good”) can be
easily abandoned, if at all. We suggest that mindfulness
in the first instance should not be equated with the
cognitive aspect of non-judging.
Rather, we propose that mindfulness is primarily con-
cerned with the emotional-motivational component of
non-judging. Consider the following thought experi-
ment. Imagine the possibility that you will not be eating
your favorite food in the next months. This is not some-
thing agreeable; yet, although one would not want this
to happen (i.e., cognitive judging occurs), it is possible
to stay emotionally calm, and to remain contented
despite this unwanted imagination (i.e., no emotional
reaction). This emotionally calm state has been termed
“balanced mind” - the fact that one does not react emo-
tionally when facing an unfavorable experience [17].
The opposite behavior would imply generation of
emotions of dislike or craving. As a result, an urge - a
specific emotional-motivational tendency - to behavio-
rally react may arise. This reaction may entail either
behavior to strengthen the favored experience, or
weaken it, if it is disliked. Together, the emotional and
motivational reactions become mutually reinforcing in a
positive feedback loop. This may explain how such
urges gain strength. Associated cognitions will likely
accompany this process.
This is why a so-called unbalanced mind - primarily
an emotional-motivational process - may lead to cogni-
tions that are judging ("I hate this!”). This rationale
provides some explanation why judging is incongruent
with mindfulness, although judging is a secondary reac-
tion or an epiphenomenon to mindfulness. Mindfulness
is characterized by not showing reactive behavior or not
indulging in emotions of craving and aversion. We do
not argue for causal orders of evaluative cognitions and
emotions. It may well be the case that specific cogni-
tions exhibit associated emotions or vice versa [39-41].
Rather, our point is that a mindful state depends pri-
marily on emotional calm, and only secondarily on the
absence of evaluative cognitions. That means that one
may calmly think “Id o n ’t like this at all” and still be
mindful. Indeed, one cannot be upset and mindful at
the same time.
Dialectics of Active Acceptance vs. Passive Acceptance
Most authors in the field of mindfulness research con-
sider “acceptance” as one of the major aspects of mind-
fulness, together with a form of directing the attention
to the present moment. In this light, some, such as
Kabat-Zinn, hold that mindfulness “includes an affec-
tionate, compassionate quality” [[34] p. 145]. This con-
ception may be interpreted as “active approval” of what
is being experienced. This describes a stance of “the pre-
sent experience is good” which includes emotional,
motivational and evaluative aspects. But how can one
approve all situations or experiences? This is seemingly
illogical. In contrast to this assumption, we believe that
m i n d f u l n e s sd o e sn o ti n v o l v es u c h“active” acceptance.
W eo p i n et h a tt h ec o n c e p to f“passive acceptance” is
consistent with the essential idea of mindfulness, and
simply suggests that one suspends or weakens evaluative
cognitions and emotional reactions in a given situation.
There is a subtle but crucial difference between the two
concepts. The former assumes that one should actively
strive to see the proverbial silver lining in all situations,
although this may be contradictory to an individual’s
ethical or philosophical grounding. The latter view, in
contrast, assumes that although we may not be able to
escape a given situation, we may withhold our emotional
or evaluative reactions, thereby possibly reducing the
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not accepting something does not necessarily imply
rejecting it.
Thus, the difference between active and passive accep-
tance can be formalized by the concept(s) of passive and
active negation [42]. To give an example, the active
negation of “Il o v ey o u ” is “Ih a t ey o u ”, whereas the
passive negation is “Id o n ’tl o v ey o u ”. In more formal
terms, the active statement “Ai sp ” may be negated by
the active negation “Ai s( n o tp ) ” as well as by its
passive negation “Not (A is p)”. In sum, the synthesis
suggests that mindfulness is the absence of reacting
towards a given experience, but not the unconditional
and active, rather naïve acceptance of a given
experience.
Conclusion
A number of practical conclusions may be drawn from
the five forms of dialectics of mindfulness: (1) activity
vs. passivity, (2) wanting vs. non-wanting, (3) changing
vs. non-changing, (4) non-judging vs. non-reacting, and
(5) active acceptance vs. passive acceptance, as presented
in this paper. To begin with, individuals in a state of
distress have a natural longing for suffering to end.
Therefore, despite the well supported clinical efficiency
of mindfulness treatments, it is crucial to explain to a
patient that mindfulness is not a remedy such as
anesthesia or analgesia. This is not to say that mindful-
ness is not intended to help - of course it is. But as it
will help an individual “only” to live with the reality of a
present moment, it should correspondingly be under-
stood as a change in one’s point of view, rather than a
direct attempt to diminish a symptom. This is particu-
larly relevant to the western medical system, given that
modern medicine with all its successes and advantages
has also fostered chronicity of certain illnesses that can-
not be cured, and so must be cared for. Mindfulness
may be a suitable avenue to that end.
Mindfulness is an approach that can be used to
change reaction(s) toward unwanted experiences.
Patients need to be aware of this point in order to avoid
unrealistic expectations that may lead to disappointment
before consenting to a mindfulness based intervention.
To be more precise, a medical professional should be
very clear when communicating to patients about what
may not change (the symptom), and what may change
(the relationship towards the symptom). As mindfulness
practice may easily be misunderstood, “side effects” such
as disappointment may occur as a result of having
misinterpreted the concept.
Second, both theory and data corroborate that mindful-
ness is an experientially oriented approach. To become
familiar with this different way of thinking, and in this
way mobilize possible health benefits of mindfulness, it is
necessary that patients practice regularly and actively.
Accordingly, mindfulness interventions should not focus
on theoretical discussions or explanations, but rather
support active practice, although an initial orientation
and repeated explanations may be necessary. In some
ways, mindfulness is like swimming - it is best learned by
doing. To date, conceptualizing along the lines of a
dose-effect model, there are no valid conclusions regard-
ing how much training is needed. However, most existing
mindfulness interventions (such as the MBSR) work with
rather high treatment schedule (e.g., 30 minutes
homework per day and two hours group session per
week) [34].
Third, the acceptance aspect of mindfulness should
not be taken to the extreme. As stated above, it would
be contrary to the concept of mindfulness (and also
counterproductive) to simply embrace anything that
happens with an accepting attitude. Rather, individuals
exercising mindfulness on a regular basis should learn
to voluntarily suspend the judging process as best possi-
ble. It is crucial to bear in mind the distinction between
active and passive acceptance, as discussed above. It
should also be stressed that mindfulness is not meant to
be a “stand-alone” treatment. To the contrary, mindful-
ness approaches should be combined with more change-
oriented approaches. Not doing so would entail the risk
of providing suboptimal clinical intervention.
Patients should be encouraged to observe and register
inner experiences without reacting to them. For this
reason, some mindfulness schools teach student(s) to
verbally express sensations. For example, in a case
where the mindfulness student experiences a sensation
of pain in the foot, the student would just state this per-
ception- “there is a certain feeling of pain in the middle
of my right foot"- without reacting to it.
The main caveat of working with mindfulness techni-
ques is not to succumb to the escapist conception that
one could “meditate the problem away by mindfulness”.
This would not be consistent with the nature of mind-
fulness. The problem is that clinicians (and perhaps
humans, in general) are trained to think in cause-effect
relations, try to identify the root of a problem, and then
try to eliminate the cause. Without a cause, the problem
should go away, and correspondingly the problem would
seem to have vanished. This approach, although per-
fectly useful for survival in the external world, and
despite having yielded tremendous progress in natural
science and technology, may not work in the cognitive-
emotional realm. Mindfulness training challenges the
thought “if I get rid of my anxiety, I will live a fulfilled
life” and replaces it with the statement “If I learn to
accept my anxiety, I will eventually learn to live with it”.
This reflects the insight that although one cannot live a
life without experiencing fear, she may be able to learn
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m e a n sb yw h i c ho n em a yb ea b l et ol i v eaf u l f i l l e dl i f e
with a disorder by (passively) accepting it. Mindfulness
should not be considered as a tool of cause-effect
thinking. This is a difficult point, and it should be
acknowledged that mindfulness involves a way of look-
ing at the realities of the world that is different for
much of a predominant paradigm of modern medicine.
In sum, mindfulness may prove to be an effective
complementary approach that can be employed in a
number of conditions to lessen subjective “illness”.
However, as we’ve shown, mindfulness differs substan-
tially from the way that Western medicine approaches
malady. Therefore, any medical professional who plans
to incorporate mindfulness approaches into her thera-
peutic repertoire needs to recognize that it involves a
dialectical, and not an “engineering"/curing, process.
The dialectical character of mindfulness discussed in
this essay is by no means complete; there are other
aspects that may be worthwhile. Nevertheless, we believe
that the five dialectical positions discussed - activity,
wanting, change, judging, and acceptance - offer a pro-
mising starting point for understanding the construct(s)
and process of mindfulness and its mechanisms of
action.
In time, empirical evidence may elucidate in what
circumstances, and to what extent mindfulness might be
most useful within the therapeutic palette of clinical medi-
cine. Our ongoing work is committed to this effort.
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